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In the SupreiDe Court of the
State of Utah

MAUDE COX PE.TERSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

CASE
NO. 8605

JOSEPH NIELSON,
Defendant and Respondent.

Brief of Plaintiff and Appellant,
Maude Cox Peterson
PRELUKINARY STATEMENT
This appeal is taken from the judgment of the District
Court of Sanpete County, sitting without a jury, the Honorable L. Leland L·arson, presiding. The subject matter
of this case arises from a collision between an automobile
driven by appellant, with a pickup truck driven by respondent, at the junction of U. S. Highway 89 with a county
road known as Shumway Road. The trial court found that
the collision was caused by the concurring negligence of
defendant and plaintiff, and denied recovery upon plain-
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tiff's complaint, and upon defendant's counterclaim. From
the judgment of the trial court denying plaintiff's right of
re-covery this appeal is taken. In appellant's Statement of
Facts, direct reference will be made to the record, in those
cases where we believe the facts are supported by the evidence. Where we believe claimed facts are not supported
by the evidence, reference will be made to the transcript.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

U. S. Highv;ay 89 is an arterial highway and extends
in a general north and south direction between Ephraim,
Utah, and Manti, Utah (R. 35). Approximately 1.1 mile
south of Ephraim, Utah, a public road known as Shumway
Road, extends in an east and west direction, enters U. S.
Highway 89 from the west (R. 34, 35). At the junction of
U. S. Highway 89 and Shumway Road, U. S. Highway 89
is hard surfaced with a good grade of asphalt 18 feet in
width, and has shoulders extending 5 or 6 feet on either
side (R. 35). Shumway Road is a graveled road 26 feet
in width. There is a stop sign on Shumway Road approximately 39 feet west of the west edge of the asphalt surface of U. S. Highway 89 (R. 35).
On April 5, 1955, at appro~imately 5:15 o'clock p. m.,
plaintiff was driving her 1955 model red-bodied DeSoto
automobile south on U. S. Highway 89, at a speed of ap-proximately 50 to 52 miles per hour (Tr. 23, 75). When
plaintiff was 'between 1000 and 900 feet north of the junction of Shumway Road, she observed defendant's truck
proceeding easterly on Shumway Road (R. 36). Plaintiff applie~ her brakes, thereby decreasing the speed of
her automobile, and continued to do so until defendant's
truck stopped near the west edge of the paved portion of
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U. S. Highway 89, at which time plaintiff was between 400
~d 500 feet north of defendant's truck (R. 36, Tr. 24).
Plaintiff kept defendant's truck in view at all times from
the ti·me she first observed it until defendant's truck
stopped (Tr. 57, 58). After plaintiff observed defendant's
truck stop, she then resumed her speed (R. 36,) of approxi·mately 50 miles per hour (Tr. 69). Although defendant proceeded past the stop sign without stopping, he
did come to a complete stop about 6 to 10 feet west of the
west edge of the paved portion of U. S. Highway 89 (R.
36). During the same time, a car driven by Yvonne Holbrook was traveling north in the north bound lane on ,U.
S. Highway 89, followed by a heavily loaded truck driven
by Elliott Johnson (R. 36). The Holbrook car passed the
plaintiff's car going in opposite directions on U. S. Highway 89 at a point approximately 75 feet to 100 feet north
of the entrance of Shumway Road (R. 36). At the same
time the truck driven by Elliott Johnson was at a point
approximately 15/100 mile (792 feet) south of the entrance
of Shumway RJoad (R. 36). Plaintiff observed someone
(defendant) in defendant's trucK: when defendant stopped,
but she could not ascertain in which direction he was looking (Tr. 39, 40). When plaintiff was 50 to 75 feet north
of the entrance to Shumway Road, defendant drove his
truck into the south bound lane of U. S. Highway 89 directly into the path of plaintiff's car (Tr. 27). The speed
of plaintiff's car immediately prior to the collision was
approximately 50 miles per hour (Tr. 69). Plaintiff immediately applied the brakes on her automobile (R. 36,
Tr. 27). Plaintiff's car left tire skid marks on the highway for a distance af 41 to 45 feet to a point at which the
plaintiff's car struck the defendant's truck (R. 36). The
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front wheels of defendant's truck were on the paved portion of U. S. Highway 89, three feet east of the west edge
thereof when the collision occurred (R. 36, 37). The impact caused plaintiff's ~ar to veer to the left on U. S. Highway 89, and left tire skid marks on said highway for a
distance of 57 to 64 feet from the point of impact to its
place of rest (R. 37). The force of the impact injured plaintiff, and substantially damaged her car (R. 37). Defendant was also injured and his truck was substantially damaged (R. 37). Plaintiff did not at any time prior to the
collision sound her horn (R. 37). The brakes on plaintiff's automobile were good, the road was dry, it was daylight, and the weather was clear (R. 36). From the time
plaintiff first saw defendant and from the time defendant
stopped near the paved portion of U. S. Highway 89 the
view of both plaintiff and defendant were unobstructed
(R. 36).
On the basis of these facts, the trial court found plaintiff negligent and that her negligence contributed to, and
was a part of the proximate cause of her injuries and damage to her automobile. Appellant contends that the judgment of the trial court in this respect is erroneous, and
hereby seeks a reversal thereof.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPFORT A FINDING THAT THE PLAIN'TIF'F' WAS TRAVELING AT A RATE OF SPEED IN EXCESS OF 60
MILES PER HOUR AT THE TIME DEFENDANT
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DROVE HIS TRUCK ONTO U. S. HIGHWAY 89, INTO
THE PATH OF PLAINTIFF'S CAR.
We are mindful of the principle that if there is any
competent evidence to support the findings of the trial
court, such findings will not be disturbed by this Court
on appeal. We have made a careful search of the record
and can find no competent evidence to support a finding
that plaintiff was at any time material herein, traveling
at a rate of speed in excess of 52 miles per hour. Plaintiff testified that her speed was around 50 miles per hour,
just as she left Ephraim, Utah (Tr. 23). This was coTroborated by the testimony of Wallace Tatton, a disinterested witness who was driving a truck south on U. S. Highway 89, just south of the city limits of Ephraim, Utah, when
plaintiff passed him (Tr. 74). When plaintiff passed Mr.
Tatton, his speed was approximately 40 'miles per hour,
and it was his judgment that plaintiff was going 10 to 12
miles per hour faster (Tr. 75). The plaintiff testified that
after she slowed down and defendant stopped, and she resumed her speed, she did not exceed her previous speed
of 50 miles per hour (Tr. 69). This was again corroborated
by the testimony of Wallace Tatton, who testified that after
plaintiff had passed him, she did not accelerate or gain
greater speed than when she was passing him (Tr. 75).
Plaintiff unequivocally testified that her speed was around
50 miles per hour just prior to the impact (Tr. 69) .
There were only four other witnesses who were in
viewing distance of the collision at the time it happened.
Those persons were the defendant, Joseph Nielson, Yvonne
Holbrook, Eliott Johnson, and Etta Johnson. The defendant, Joseph Nielson, could make no observation of plain-
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tiff's speed, since he didn't even see plaintiff's car (Tr. 286,
291, 333). The witness Yvonne HJollbrook observed plaintiff's car approaching on U. S. Highway 89, but she gave
no testimony with respect to the speed of plaintiff's car.
The witness, Elliott Johnson, who observed the collision
(Tr. 121) was driving a heavily loaded truck north on U.
S. Highway 89, and was south of Shumway Road 15/100
of a mile (792 feet), at the time of the collision (R. 36,
Tr. 126). He gave no testimony with respect to the speed
of plaintiff's car.
The witness Etta Johnson was a passenger in the front
seat of the Holbrook automobile (Tr. 196). She gave no
direct testimony of the speed of plaintiff's automobile. Her
testimony was that she first observed plaintiff's automobile when the Holbrook car was 200 feet south of Shumway Road (Tr. 197). She testified that at that moment
the plaintiff's automobile was in the approximate location
of the two white posts designated at points number 3 and
4 of defendant's Exhibit Number 2, which she estimated to
be 1000 feet north of Shum,way Road (Tr. 203). She then
testified that the Holbrook automobile passed plaintiff's
automobile when both automobiles were approximately
150 to 200 feet north of Shumway Road (Tr. 198). Apparently the defendant intended to establish by such testimony that the plaintiff's automobile traveled a distance
of 800 to 850 feet during the same interval of time which
the Holbrook automobile traveled 350 to 400 feet. The
Holbrook automobile during such interval, was traveling
at a rate of 50 to 55 miles per hour (R. 35, Tr. 12, 203).
A computation based upon the extremes of the foregoing,
would indieate that the speed of plaintiff's automobile was
between 100 to 133 miles per hour. Mrs. Johnson also
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testified it could be that the plaintiff was going four times
as fast as the Holbrook automobile, i. e. 200 to 220 miles
per hour, which, of course, is preposterous (Tr. 203).
Such inferences and statements by this witness are
speculative and are solely based upon conjecture. It is
clear from the record that her judgment and concept of
distances are grossly exaggerated and erroneous. For example, Mrs. Johnson testified that in her judgment it was
200 feet from where she was sitting in the courtroom to
a certain red brick house in front of which there was a
new pickup truck (Tr. 207, 208). The same distance was
paced off by a Deputy Sheriff, Park Miner, and was actually found to be in excess of 549 feet (Tr. 325).
It is obvious that the testimony of Mrs. Johnson is
based upon such gross misjudgment of distances that it
would not be entitled to any weight whatsoever. Although
we cannot tell with certainty what weight, if any, the trial
court gave to her testimony, it appears that no credence
was given it at all. This is apparent from the court making
a finding that the Holbrook automobile and the plaintiff's
automobile passed each other when the Holbrook automobile was 75 to 100 feet north from defendant's truck ('R.
36) . Mrs. Johnson testified to the very same distance as
being 150 to 200 feet (Tr. 198).
If, however, we are in error, and the findings of the
trial court that plaintiff was traveling at a rate of speed
in excess of 60 miles per hour was based upon the testimony of Mrs. Johnson, we submit that such finding cannot stand. Such a finding cannot be based on mere speculation or conjecture, but must be based on the preponderance of the evidence. Alvarado vs. Tucker, et al, 2 Utah
2d 16, 268 P. 2d 986. There must be competent, credible
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eVidence to support the findings made by the trial court.
Jensen vs. Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P. 2d 1070; Buckley
vs .Cox, 122 Utah 151, 247 P. 2d 277. The testimony of
Mrs. Johnson could not by any stretch of the imagination
be considered competent and credible. It was the duty of
the trial court as the trier of the fact to ·completely disregard such evidence. The only other testimony relating
to the speed of plaintiff's automobile was that of Dr. H.
Reed Christensen. The testimony of Dr. Christensen falls
in the same category as that of Mrs. Johnson. The trial
court permitted Dr. Christensen to give his opinion upon
a hypothetical question supposedly encompassing the facts
of this case. His opinion was that the speed of plaintiff's
car was between 63 and 85 miles per hour. We presume
that this opinion was the basis of the finding of the trial
court that plaintiff was traveling at a speed in excess of
60 miles per hour, since the record is devoid of any other
evidence to support such a finding.
We submit that the opinion of Dr. Christensen was
incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, and it was error
for the trial court .to admit such evidence over the objection of plaintiff, if such evidence were admitted. As a
matter of fact, we are unable to determine from the record whether the opinions of Dr. Christensen were even
admitted as evidence. When the witness was asked for
his opinion as to the speed of plaintiff's automobile prior
to the impact, we strongly objected (Tr. 245, 246, 247, 248).
In ruling on the objection, the trial court stated, "Well,
I don't think he could get into any court hut this one."
Then the court asked the witness for his opinion on how
quick a car can stop that is traveling 50 miles per hour on
an open highway under laid cement, assuming there was
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no car in front of him, and no obstructions (Tr. 248). The
witness answered, "Well, all I could do there is take what
the State Engineer says", referring to the card marked
Defendant's Exhibit 6 (Tr. 247). ,On page 249 of the transcript the court, acting as the interrogator, asked the witness, "What did you get on that? I won't accept it as
evidence, hut I would like to hear you." We then moved
that all of the testimony of D'r. Christensen be stricken
(Tr. 256) . The trial court ruled, "I'm not going to admit
it except for what it is worth." Again on page 257 of the
transcript, the trial court stated, "I don't consider it a
proper interrogatory under all the circumstances . . . . .
I will just have to use it for its worth". On page 258 of
the transcript, the court stated: "Well, I won't accept it
as a hypothetical question at all." All of the foregoing
statements by the trial court would lead us to believe that
the testimony of Dr. Christensen was not admitted as evidence. However, when the trial court made its finding that
plaintiff was traveling at a rate of speed in excess of 60
miles per hour, we must assume that the testimony of Dr.
Christensen was considered. If such testimony was considered, we submit that it was prejudicial error hy the trial
court to do so.
The only basis upon which Dr. Christensen oould testify was by giving his opinion in response to the hypothetical question. Dr. Christensen was not an eye witness to
the collision, he observed no skid marks relative to the
-collision, and he never saw the defendant's truck, or pictures of it, even before or after the eoHision (Tr. 256) .
Although the question of whether a witness is qualified to
give an opinion generally rests with discretion of the trial
court, the record clearly shows that Dr. Christensen was
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not qualified to give an opinion of the speed of plaintiff's
automobile immediately prior to the collision. On voir
dire examination he admitted that he had never before
calculated speed of automobiles from skid marks involved
in collisions (Tr. 242). He made some experiments on measuring coefficient of friction, and did some experimentation
in the theory of the subject (Tr. 242). He could not express an opinion on how quickly an automobile could stop
under certain conditions, but could only testify as to the
corresponding figure shown on the Utah Highway Patrol
chart (Defendant's Exhibit 6, which strangely enough
was admitted in evidence only to illustrate the testimony
of the witness (Tr. 244, 245). The only qualifications
shown was that the witness holds a degree of Doctor of
Physics, (Tr. 241), has been a teacher of physics for 28 to
30 years, and did some special work for the government in
physics during the war from 1942 to 1946 (Tr. 243). We
objected to his qualifications (Tr. 243). We submit that it
was an abuse of discretion of the trial court to permit him
to testify as an expert in the application of impact and momentum theories to automobiles. We strongly contend that
the testimony of !Dr. Christensen insofar as it related to
the speed of plaintiff's automobile was Wholly incompetent.
There is some confusion among the adjudicated cases
of the extent to which experts who are not eye witnesses
to the collision may be permitted to give an opinion. Although it is well settled in Utah that the use of tire marks
of a skidding automobile is used as the basis for expert testi~mony (State v. Lingman, 97 Utah 180, 91 P. 2d 457), we
have grave doubt about such rule being scientifically sound.
In this connection we respectfully call the Court's attention to the excellent book entitled, "Tire Dynamics", by
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Andrew J. White, First Edition, published by Motor Vehicle Research, Inc., which is a comprehensive experimentation in the field of tire marks and their relationship to
vehicle velocity prior to brake application. On page 62
thereof, the following statement is made:
"The measurement of physical marks with a measuring
tape is one method generally used by police and others
in an effort to relate tire mark length to vehicle velocity prior to brake application. While this method
is an acceptable one for measurement, it accomplishes
just one thing, namely the length of tire marks. When
the information gathered is used in an attempt to estaJblish even the minimum speed, the vehicle must have
been traveling, the number of variables involving road
surface differentials, tires, atmospheric temperature,
time of year and others, render almost any estimation of speed invalid."
The author then gives numerous reasons to support
the foregoing statement.
The case of State vs. Lingman, cited above, goes furthur than any other case we have examined in permitting
the expert testimony as to the speed of automobiles, based
on a hypothetical question. We 'believe that the admonitions expressed by Chief Justice Wolfe therein, are very
pertinent to the case at bar. To begin with, in the Lingman case objections were raised to the qualifications of
the expert, who was a professor in the Department of Mechanical Engineering at the University of Utah, and had
been teaching there for over 35 years; whether this qualified him was left up to the trial court. The professor testified that the loss of impact of bodies were applicable to
automobiles, whereas in the instant case Dr. Christensen
had nothing to say on this point.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
.· Secondly, the witness (in the Lingman case) based
his opmion on a formula which included only the purely
physical facts of directions of the two cars, and their
weights, the points of impact, the coefficient of restitution,
the frictional resistance of the surface over which the
struck car was pushed, and the distance of the sideward
movement in the struck car. A comparison of the factors employed in the hypothetical question in the Lingman
case with those of the instant case shows that the latter
was so lacking in so many material physical facts that any
opinion based thereon would ·be of no value whatsoever.
For example, in the instant case, the question made no reference to the coefficient of restitution, although the witness assumed an elastic impact. The question made no
mention of the speed or momentum of defendant's truck,
and the witness did not take into consideration the speed
of the truck (Tr. 250), although the truck was in motion
at the time of impact (Tr. 27, 123). The witness assumed
that all of the energy which propelled the defendant's truck
was transferred from plaintiff's car (Tr. 255), yet there
was no evidence to support such fact. The question did
not take into consideration the manner in which the defendant's truck ·whirled around, namely, whether the truck
pivoted on its own rear wheels, and skidded only on the
front wheels, or whether all four wheels skidded. The witness did not take into consideration the direction the truck
moved after the impact (Tr. 262). The question did not
take into consideration the nature of the surface of the
ground over which the truck skidded. The question asked
the witness to assume that ·the defendant's truck moved
in a ·circular direction for 30 feet (Tr. 246), whereas the
witness based his calculations on a total movement of 60
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feet for the truck (Tr. 260). The question did not take
into consideration whether the tire marks left by plaintiff's automobile resulted from a locked-wheels, or impending-skid phenomena, which is an important consideration.
(See "Tire Dynamics" by Alfred J. White, pages 34, 35,
and 38). The witness assumed that all four wheels were
completely locked (Tr. 261), yet there is no evidence to
support such fact. The question did not take into consideration whether the tires on plaintiff's car were natural
rubber or synthetic rubber, which is important since the
co-efficient of friction for both are not the same. (See "Tire
Dynamics", supra, page 151). There are numerous other
material factors which were omitted from the hypothetical
question that should be mentioned; however, in the interest of brevity we shall not discuss them further.
Referring back to the Lingman case, supra, on page
462 of the Pacific Reports, this ·Court expressed some doubt
as to whether the testimony in that case would 1be admissible if there was an unreliable personal equation for which
the experts could not make allowance, such as skill of the
drivers and their reactions in an emergency, in addition to
the unknown speed of one or both of the cars where that
was of controlling importance (Citing cases including Blashfield, Permanent Edition, Section 6312). It was then pointed out that those unpredictable factors were of no significance in that case under the hypothesis of the witness,
since the skid marks of the pushed car showed only a direct sideward movement with no twirling motion of the
car from which it could be inferred that the factors of human reaction and momentum were of no significance. We
wish to emphasize the fact that in the Lingman case, supra, there was no twirling motion of the struck car, whereas
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in the instant case the trial court found that defendant's
truck was knocked completely around (R. 37) . If such
factor had existed in the Lingman case, supra, the opinion
therein suggests that the result could well have been different. On page 463 of the Pacific Reporter, it is stated:
"We do not mean to state that in all cases of impact
such evidence by experts as was here introduced is
admissible. But under the physical circumstances of
this case, as shown by the tire marks demonstrating
that the car had been pushed sidewise and not twisted,
the evidence was admissible."
This Court then goes on to admonish the trial court
and counsel to be very cautious in the use of opinion evidence, and clearly states the rule as follows:
"Experts may give answer to such questions both on
theirown observations as a foundation, or on evidence
adduced from other sources which may for the purposes of the question be assumed as facts. (Citing
cases). But experts cannot give an opinion on matters not observed by them, or not in evidence by the
testimony of others. We have discussed with perhaps
too much particularity the claimed ommision and intrusions of f.act claimed not to be in evidence. We
do not consider it necessary to further discuss this
question, save to advance the admonition that the
Court and counsel should be careful to see that a hypothetical question presents or assumes no fact that is
not in evidence; that it does present all facts or elements necessary to the determination to be made by
the witness, or to enable him properly to form an expert opinion; and that no material element or fact is
used by the witness in his determination that is not
presented in the question as asked."
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Applying the foregoing rule to the facts of this case
as shown by the record, and as discussed above, any opinion as to the speed of plaintiff's automobile given by the
witness, Dr. Christensen, is wholly incompetent. The conclusion is inescapable that it was error to permit Dr. Christensen to give his opinion of the speed of plaintiff's automobile.
The record is devoid of any other evidence to support
a finding that plaintiff was traveling at a rate of speed in
excess of 60 miles per hour. The burden was upon defendant to prove that plaintiff was speeding. Such a finding
cannot be based on mere speculation or conjecture, but
must be based on the preponderance of the evidence. (Alvarado vs. Tucker, et al, 2 tJtah 2d 16, 268 P. 2d 986.)
We submit that the· finding made by the trial court in this
respect cannot stand, and is wholly unsupported by any
competent evidence.
POINT II
THJERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE SPEED AT WHICH
PLAINTIFF WAS TRAVELING WHEN DEFENDANT'S
TRUCK MOVED ONTO THE HIGHWAY DIRECTLY IN
FRONT OF PLAINTIFF CONTRIBUTED TO, OR WAS
A PART OF, THE PRO,XIMATE CAUSE OF HER INJURIES.
Even if there were competent evidence to support a
finding that plaintiff was traveling at a speed in excess
of 60 miles per ·hour, theve still must be competent evidence to support the finding that such excess of speed was
the proximate cause of the collision. Alvarado vs. Tucker,
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et al, 2 Utah 2d 216, 268 P. 2d 986. In the Alvarado case,
a child darted out from behind a moving car into the path
of defendant. The only contention made as to defendant's
negligence was that defendant was speeding. The area
was zoned for 25 miles per hour. An experienced police
officer testified on cross examination that his opinion of the
actual speed of defendant's car, based on tire skid marks,
was 25 to 30 miles per hour. It was held that such evidence would support a finding of a speed of only 25 miles
per hour. On the subject of proximate cause, the court
stated on page 988 of the Pacific Reporter as follows:
"Even if the plaintiff were correct in hev contention
that the evidence would justify a finding of 5 or 10
miles per hour in excess of the speed limit, she would
still be faced with the necessity of proving that such
excess of speed was the proximate cause of the injury. Under the facts here shown, that as the defendant was proceeding southward, the plaintiff darted
westward across the street and came out from behind
the north bound car into defendant's course of travel.
Nothing appears in the evidence, either directly or from
reasonable inference, to indicate that he could have
stopped in time to avoid striking plaintiff, even if he
had been traveling only 25 miles per hour. In other
words, from anything that appeared, the fact of such
excess speed would not have made the difference between hitting or avoiding plaintiff."
The fact that an automobile was going at an unlawful
or e:xcessive speed, in violation of either common law rules
or a statute or ordinance, at the time of the collision, does
not constitute a bar for injuries sustained in the collision,
if such violation was not a proximate cause of the accident. Stated in other words, the act of a motorist in driv-
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ing at an improper rate of speed at the time of a collision
will not prevent his recovering for injuries from such collision, if the accident would have happened if his speed had
been proper. Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law
and Practice, Section 2611.
In the instant case, the trial court found that the
plaintiff's car and the Holbrook ear passed each other going in opposite directions at approximately 75 to 100 feet
north of Shumway Road (R. 36). Plaintiff testified that
she was 50 to 75 feet from the Shumway Road, and that
she was even with the Holbrook ear when she first realized defendant was going to morve onto the highway in
front of her (Tr. 27, 40). This testimony is corroborated
by the testimony of Elliott Johnson, who stated that defendant's truck began to move onto the highway just as
the Ho}brook car passed the intersection (Tr. 124, 125), at
which time plaintiff's car and the HJolbrook car were very
close together (Tr. 135), or very near parallel (Tr. 136).
Assuming that the plaintiff was traveling at a speed
of 50 miles per hour, or 74 feet per second, in point of time
only 1 to 1.35 seconds of time would elapse in clos.ing the
respective distances of 75 feet to 100 feet. The reaction
time for an average person as shown by table 4 on defendant's Exhibit N·umber 6, is 3,4 second, during which interval a car moving at a speed of 50 miles per hour would
travel a distance of 55 feet. Deducting the reaction time,
there would remain from .25 to .60 secornd of time within
which to stop plaintiff's car after the :brake pedal had been
depressed, or in terms of distance from 20 feet to 45 feet.
The respective time intervals and distances would proportionately decrease if it were assumed that plaintiff was traveling at a speed in excess of HO miles per hOW'. It would
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appear from table four of defendant's Exhibit Number
6, that it would take an average driver a distance of 100
feet to stop an average automobile traveling at a speed of
35 miles per hour on good pavement from the instant he
observes the danger. Applying the foregoing to the instant
case, it is apparent that if plaintiff were traveling at a
rate of 35 miles per hour at the instant she observed defendant's truck move onto the highway, it would have
taken 100 feet to stop her automobile, and the collision still
would have occurred. Likewise, if the distance were 75
feet her speed could have been slightly less than 30 miles
per hour, and the collision still would have occurred.
It is obvious from the foregoing that when defendant
moved onto the highway in front of plaintiff at the instant
plaintiff was 75 to 100 feet away, the collision would have
occurred regardless of whether the speed of plaintiff's automolbile was in excess of 60 miles per hour, 50 miles per
hour, 35 miles per hour, or possibly 30 miles per hour. Under the rules set forth in Blashfield, and the case of Alvarado vs. Tucker, et al, cited above, we are at a loss to
understand upon what evidence the trial court could find
and conclude that the speed of plaintiff's automobile was
a proximate cause of the collision. We submit that no such
evidence exists in the record. Such a finding cannot stand
when there is no competent evidence to support it.
POINT Ill
THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE S·PEED AT WHICH
PUAINTIFF WAS TRAVELING AT THE TIME DEFENDANT DROVE ONTO HIGHWAY 89, INTO THE
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PATH OF PLAINTIFF'S CAR, WAS NOT REASONABLE
OR PRUDENT UNDER THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES.

U. S. Highway 89 is an arterial highway between the
cities of Ephraim and Manti, Utah (R. 35). The posted
speed limit along the foregoing section of highway is, and
was, at the time of the collision, 60 miles per hour (Tr.
98). Section 41-6-46, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, fixes the
speed limit on the highways of this state, and highway 89
in the area in question falls within subdivision 41-6-46(b)
(3), which is fixed at 60 miles per hour. This statute requires that a driver shall not drive at a speed greater than
is reasonable in view of the existing conditions and hazards on the highway; that his speed shall be controlled so as
to avoid colliding with other vehicles entering upon the
highway in a lawful manner, and that the speed shall be
appropriately reduced when special hazards exist with respect to other traffic, or by reason of weather conditions.
Horsley vs. Robinson, 112 Utah 227, 186 P. 2d 592. There
can be no question about the fact that the -conduct of defendant in driving onto the highway directly into the path
of plaintiff's automobile when she was 75 to 100 feet north
of defendant, was unlawful.
Plaintiff was driving her automobile south on highway 89, at a speed of approximately 50 to 52 miles per
hour (Tr. 23, 75). When she was between 1000 and 900
feet north of the junction of Shumway Road, she observed
defendant's truck proceeding east on Shumway Road (R.
36) . She decreased her speed until she observed defendant's truck stop near the west edge of the paved portion
of Hlighway 89, at which time she was approximately 400
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to 500 feet north of defendant's stopped truck (Tr. 57, 58).
After plaintiff observed defendant's truck stop, she assumed that defendant was going to yield to her right of
way, and she then increased her speed to approximately
50 miles per hour (Tr. 69). When plaintiff was 75 to 100
feet north of the entrance of Shumway Road (R. 36, Tr.
27), defendant drove his truck into the highway directly
into the path of plaintiff (Tr. 27). The speed of plaintiff's
automobile prior to the collision, was 50 miles per hour
(Tr. 69).
Plaintiff had the right to assume that defendant would
not drive negligently. When defendant stopped his truck
before entering upon the highway, plaintiff assumed and
had the right to rely on the fact that defendant was going
to, and would, yield to her right of way. Such is the holding of the case of Keir vs. Trager, et al, 134 Kansas 505,
7 P. 2d 49. In that case the Kansas Court held that plaintiff, who was the favored driver, relied on the fact that
defndant, who was entering the intersection from a secondary road controllod by a stop sign, was going to stop.
The defendant failed to stop, and a collision occurred. On
page 50 of the Pacific Reporter, the Kansas Court stated:
"The law is well established that the operator of an
automobile on a public highway may assume that others using the highway will observe the law of the road
and is not guilty of contributory negligence in acting
upon such assumption, unless and until he has knowledge to the contrary. (Citing eases).
"The appellee (plaintiff) was wholly within her rights
in assuming that the appellant (defendant) would stop
before entering the highway, and she cannot be charged
with negligence in acting upon such assumption. She
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can only be charged with negligence under such circumstances from the time that she had knowledge that
the defendant intended to disobey stop sign and enter
upon the highway. After she had such knowledge, she
was bound to use the care of an ordinary, prudent person."

The foregoing rule has also been adopted in Utah, and
is finnly esta;blished by expressions of this Court. The
case of Hess vs. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 P. 2d 510, involved a situation where the plaintiff, who was driving along
a through street, collided with an ambulance which had
entered an intersection against a stop sign. Plaintiff failed
to look to the right to see the ambulance approaching. In
the majority opinion, it was pointed out that the jury could
well find it to 'be within plaintiff's duty of due care to assume that the driver of the ambulance would obey the stop
sign, and that he was entitled to proceed through the intersection until it became apparent to him that the ambulance would not stop. In the case of Lowder vs. Holley, 120
Utah 231, 233 P. 2d 350, where plaintiff failed to see defendant approaching the intersection from the right, it was
pointed out that even if the plaintiff had seen defendant,
it could be found to be within his duty of care to assume
that defendant would yield him the right of way. In Martin vs. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P. 2d 747, this Couvt
stated, on page 751 of the Pacific Reporter, as follows:
''Although plaintiff had the right of way under both
rules above referred to, yet there devolved upon him
the duty of care in observing for otheT traffic, but in
doing so he had the right to assume, and to rely and
act on the assumption that others would do likewise;
he was not obliged to anticipate either that other driv..
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ers would drive negligently, nor fail to accord him his
right of way, until in the exercise of due care, he observed, or should have observed, something to warn
him that the other driver was driving negligently or
would fail to accord him his right of way. If this principle is not clear in the earlier Utah cases, it is finnly
established by the more recent expressions of this
c·ourt.''
To the same effect is the case of Bates vs. Burns, 3 Utah
2d 180, 281 P. 2d 209.
The duty of care imposed upon the driver of an arterial highway is very clearly set forth in the case of Botts
vs. Rushton, 63 Nevada 426, 172 P. 2d 147. On page 153
of the Pacific Reporter it is stated:
"A driver on a through or arterial highway who is driving at lawful speed and in a lawful manner has the
right of way at an intersection with a secondary stop
sign highway, and is entitled to assume that a driver
on the latter will obey the law until the contrary appears, or should appear to a reasonable man in his
position. If the favored driver, keeping a careful look
out as he approaches or enters the intersection, sees
or becomes aware of anything indicating that the driver on the secondary highway does not intend to yield
the right of way, he is bound to use the care of an
ordinarily prudent person in endeavoring to avoid an
accident. If the driver on the favored highway is himself free from negligence in approaching the intersection, he has the right to presume that the driver on the
disfavored highway will yield the right of way to him
and not proceed into the intersections until he can do
so without creating a traffic hazard. The purpose of
arterial highways is to facilitate through traffic, afford rapid transit, and permit vehicles thereon to move
freely, thus accelerating the flow of traffic over such
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favored highways. As a general rule it is not necessary for such drivers on such highways to stop or slow
up as they reach a stop sign intersection highway, in
order to ascertain whether or not the driver on the
latter is going to stop and yield the right of way. The
right of way enjoyed by the driver on the favored highway does not relieve him of the duty to keep a careful
lookout so that he may observe whether the driver
on the disfavored highway is going to yield the right
of way; but he is not obliged to have his car under such
control at an intersection stop sign highway that he
may stop at once and so avoid collision with pe·rsons
who may illegally come into his path. If a driver on a
trunk line is proceeding in a lawful manner, there is
no rule which requires him to keep his car under such
control as to be able to stop within a given number of
feet."
In the instant case, after defendant stopped, he did not
move again until after the Holbrook car had passed him
(Tr. 123, 286). The ·evidence conclusively shows that defendant did northing to put plaintiff on notice that he was
not going to yield to plaintiff her right of way until plaintiff was approximately 75 to 100 feet from the Shumway
Road, and in point of time approximately 1 second away.
As soon as plaintiff observed that defendant started to
drive onto the highway she immediately applied her brakes
(Tr. 27). This is substantiated by the tire braking marks
which began from 41 to 45 feet north of the point of impact (R. 36) coupled with her reaction time. It was impossible for plaintiff to turn into the north bound lane since
the Holbrook car was abreast of plaintiff's car at that instant, and was followed by a heavily loaded truck driven
by Elliott Johnson (R. 36).
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A similar fact situation existed in the case of Guegel
vs. Bailey, 199 Oklahoma 441, 186 P. 2d 827, wherein defendant was driving west on a through highway. Deceased
was driving south on a secondary road upon which there
existed a stop sign. After deceased had stopped, or slowed
down, he drove onto the highway in front of defendant's
car. Defendant applied her brakes as soon as she could,
but coHided with deceased's car. On page 828 of the Pacific Reporter the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated that:
"In the instant case, the deceased drove from !behind
a bus onto Tenth Street in front of defendant's car.
From that time on, defendant was required to act as
a reasonably prudent person would have acted under

such circumstances. The application of this rule would
determine whether or not she was negligent, not the
statute."
We are mindful of the fact that under the authorities
cited above, the question of whether plaintiff's speed was
reasonable is a question of fact to be determined by the
trial court when sitting without a jury. We assume that the
finding of the trial court that a speed at which plaintiff
was driving was not prudent or reasonable under the existing circumstances, was based upon its erroneous finding
that plaintiff was traveling at a speed in excess of 60 miles
per hour. For the reason stated under point No. 1, there
was no competent evidence to support a finding that plaintiff was traveling in excess of 50 to 52 miles per hour immediately prior to the collision. The issue involved herein
then becomes whether or not reasonable minds could differ as to whether plaintiff's speed of between 50 to 52 miles
per hour was not reasonable and prudent under existing
circumstances. We emphasize the fact that the speed at
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which plaintiff was driving was well under the statutory
posted 60 mile per hour limit. We believe that under the
test and standards set forth in the authorities cited above,
that reasoruuble minds could reach only the conclusion that
plaintiff's speed was reasonable and prudent under the existing circumstances. It would be an unwise rule of law
to require a driver on an arterial highway to slow down
at the junction of every county lane, sideroad and eounty
road in antieipation that a driver thereon might nort obey
the law, and enter onto the highway at any time even when
the favored driver was within a hazardous distance. The
concurring opinion of Chief Justice Wolfe in the case of
Poulson vs, Manness, 121 Utah 269, 241 P. 2d 152, supports this view. On page 155 of the Pacific Reporter Chief
Justice Wolfe stated:
"The instant case falls within a category which should
he denominated a highway case. Here maximum lawful speed is permitted on the oiled highway and it appears undisputed that there was a duty upon the plaintiff to stop before attempting to er.oss the highway.
This situation we must expect the reasonable prudent
person to look greater distances in order to ascertain
that he can cross with safety. The speed of oncoming
traffic being greater, the time for appraisement and
decision must necessarily ;be shorter. This, of ·course,
every motorist realizes.
"Another way of stating it is that a motorist driving
on a fast arterial highway need not treat every country
lane or relatively ·minor sideroad as an intersection.
He has the right of way .for a much greater distance."
It would be even a more harsh rule of law to require
a driver on an arterial highway when he observed that a
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driver on a· secondary road has stopped before entering
the highway, to slow down to such a speed that will enable the favored driver to stop and avoid a collision in the
event the disfavored driver decided to drive onto the highway at any instant he desires. Either of the rules would
defeat the very purpose of the arterial highway, and would
impede and obstruct traffic thereon, rather than facilitate
the movement of such traffic. The only conclusion which
would be reached from an application of either rule is well
started by Mr. Justice Crockett in the majority opinion in
the case of Martin vs. Stevens, cited above. On page 750
of the Pacific Reporter he states:
"If a driver has to drive his car under the assumption
that everyone else is apt to be negligent, the next step
would be for him to conclude that he better get off
the streets entirely or someone is likely to hit him,
and abandon the streets to those who were just willing
to take chances. If, under circumstances such as present in this case, where the plaintiff's right of way is
so clear that no reasonable person could have any
doubt about it, he could not assume that he would be
afforded his right of way, the only way drivers could
safely proceed at an intersection would be to resort
to: 'you first, my dear Gaston, - No, after you, my
dear Alphonse,' procedure, or get out and hold a conference before either could safely proceed."
We submit that the plaintiff's speed under the existing circumstances was reasonable and prudent and under
the record of this case reasonable minds could not differ.
We further submit that there was no competent evidence
to support a finding that the speed at which plaintiff was
driving was not reasonable and prudent under the existing conditions.
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POINT IV
THERE IS NO COMPETE.NT EVID,ENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO
KEEP A PROPER LOOKOUT, OR THAT PLAINTIFF
WAS NEGLIGENT IN ANY MANNER.
The trial court made findings that plaintiff did not
observe that defendant was not looking to the north, or
that his attention was focused on the HoJbrook car approaching from the south, and plaintiff did not sound her
horn (R. 37). Plaintiff first observed defendant's truck
traveling east on Shumway Road when plaintiff was between 1000 and 900 feet north of Shumway Road (R. 36).
Plaintiff kept defendant's truck in view at all times from
the time she first observed it until it stopped, at which
time plaintiff was 400 feet to 500 feet north of Shumway
Road (Tr. 57, 48 R. 36). After defendant stopped he did
nothing that plaintiff observed, except remain stopped,
until he drove his truck onto the highway directly into the
path of plaintiff (Tr. 27). Plaintiff observed someone,
(defendant), in defendant's truck when it stopped, but she
was unable to tell in which direction he was looking (Tr.
39, 40). Plaintiff saw defendant's truck mo¥e the instant
it began to move forward onto the highway (Tr. 39). During all times mentioned cubove neither the view of the plaintiff, nor the view of the defendant was obstructed of each
other (R. 36).
We are at a loss to understand how the trial court
could find that plaintiff had a duty to observe that defendant did not look to the north before driving onto the highway, when plaintiff, in seeing the defendant in his truck,
couldn't tell in which direction defendant was loo~.
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Surely the defendant could have glanced to the north with
a quick movement of his head, or even just with his eyes
with no movement of his head, and it would have been virtually impossible for plaintiff to see such movement. It
must be remembered that plaintiff had to keep her attention focused on the road ahead, the Holbrook car which
was then approaching from the south, and the defendant's
truck. Yet, the trial court found it plaintiff's duty to look
into the ca:b of defendant's truck and observe that defendant did not look to the north. Defendant had the duty to
look to the north and observe plaintiff's car approaching.
Plaintiff had the right to assume that defendant did look,
and she could not be held contributorily negligent for relying on that assumption. This is true particularly in view
of the fact that defendant had stopped and plaintiff assumed that defendant was going to yield to her right of
way. We believe the foregoing comes within the spirit and
very purpose of the principles set forth in Martin vs. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P. 2d 747, as discussed above.
We have been unable to find any case where the duty
was imposed upon the favored driver on the arterial highway to observe that the disfavored driver entering the
highway from a secondary road had not looked in the direction of the favored driver. Such a duty is so contrary
to common sense and reason, and it would place such a
hopeless burden on any driver, that it doesn't warrant any
further argument.
There is no dispute about the finding that plaintiff
did nort sound the horn of her automobile as she approached
Shumway Road (R. 37, Tr. 87). In view of what we have
said above, we do not believe that there devolved upon the
plaintiff any duty to so do. If it were so determined, as
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the trial court found, that plaintiff had a duty to observe
that defendant did not look to the north, we can see reason
for imposing the duty to sound her horn. In such event,
since plaintiff would be on notice that defendant did not
see her and might proceed onto the highway, the trier of
the fact could well find that plaintiff should have sounded
her horn. Such a duty could well be imposed under Section 41-6-146, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides
in part that the driver of a motor vehicle shall, when reasonably necessary to insure safe operation, give audilble
warning with his horn, burt shall not otherwise use such
horn upon the highway. If, however, plaintiff did not have
the duty to observe that defendant had nort looked in her
direction, plaintiff did nort have the duty to sound her horn
under the foregoing statute. Since we are convinced that
plaintiff had no such duty to observe, we contend she had
no duty to sound her horn.
The duty of care required in the instant case is the
duty imposed upon the driver on an arterial highway, who
is confronted with secondary roads controlled by stop signs.
Since this is an arterial highway case, the facts are somewhat similar to Poulsen vs. Manness, 121 Utah 269, 241 P.
2d 152, which involved a coHision at the intersection at an
arterial highway with a county road. In the instant case
we have the additional fact that the county road was controlled by a stop sign, whereas in the Poulsen case the
county road therein was uncontrolled. In the Poulsen case
Chief Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion, on page 155
of the Pacific Reporter, pointed out:
"The city intersection collision is usually under ·circumstances quite different from those of this case. This
·case is unlike Bullock vs. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P. 2d
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350; Hickok vs. Skinner 113 Utah 1, 190 P. 2d, 514;
Conklin vs. Walsh 113 Utah 276, 193 P. 2d 437; Gren
vs. Norton, Utah 213 P. 2d 356. It is different from
Mingus vs. Olsson, Utah, 201 P. 2d 495, although there
may be some broad principles of law stated in those
cases appUcable to intersection or for that matter
any automobile collision case. It is the factual differences which arise out of human conduct that give birth
to refinements in cases which differentiate them.
"This case differs materially from Hess vs. Robinson,
109 Utah 60, 163 P. 2d, 510. True, it is assimilable to
Lowder vs. Holley, Utah, 1951, 233 P. 2d, 350, 353,
except in that case two county roads intersected; not
a country road with a speed inviting highway. This
situation may come up more often in the future as cars
emerge from country lanes or secondary roads onto
through and cross-continental highways where great
disparity of speed may be the usual thing which on
the roads intersecting in the case of Lowder vs. Holley,
supra, was not expectable . . . . .".
This case is also distinguishable from the cases of Sine
vs. Salt Lake Transportation Company, 106 Utah 289, 147
P. 2d 875·; Hickok vs. Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 190 P. 2d 514;
Conklin vs. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P. 2d, 437, and Gren
vs. Norton, 117 Urtah 121, 213 P. 2d 356, where the driver
was held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law. Each of those cases was decided upon the proposition that the circumstances were such that the driver held
to be negligent as a matter of law either observed, or in
the exercice of due care should have observed the manner
in which the other driver was approaching the intersection,
and clearly could by ordinary reasonable care have avoided
the ·collision. In each of those cases, the negligence of the
driver was so clear that a reasonable mind could not find
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to the contrary.

In referring to the foregoing cases in the case of Martin vs. Stevens cited above, on page 751, this Court stated
as follows:
"There has been, and still is much discussion and disagreement as to whether the various fact situations
in those cases come under the foregoing rule. But
there is no disagreement about the rule. If as stated
by Chief Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion the
facts of Hickok vs. Skinner, supra, do not bring it
within the principle above stated, it was wrongly d~
cided, and is hereby overruled. Those cases do not
purport to lay down any other standard than that of
ordinary r-easonable care. No matter how far afield
one may go in reviewing, analyzing and rationalizing
the decisions in these intersection cases, he must always
come back to the one basic concept that underlies and
controls the Law of Torts: the conduct of the mythioal
but extremely useful 'ordinary, reasonable, prudent
man under the circumstances,' all of which is encompassed in the shorter phrase, 'due care'."
We submit that the conduct of plaintiff from the time
she first observed defendant's truck until the collision occurred was all that could be expected of the ordinary reasonable, prudent man. The record overwhelmingly shows
that she maintained a proper lookout. Plaintiff kept the
defendant's truck in her view until it stopped. She observed the truck the instant it began moving forward onto
the highway. She immediately applied her brakes, but it
was too late to avoid the coUision. Under the standards
and principles set forth in the authorities cited herein, and
based upon the record in this case, reasonable minds could
not differ in reaching the conclusion that plaintiff was free
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from negligence. There is no evidence to support a finding otherwise.
CONCLUSION

The record is devoid of any competent evidence to support the finding of the trial court that plaintiff was traveling
at a speed in excess of 50 to 52 miles per hour immediately
prior to the collision. Plaintiff unequivocally testified that
her speed was 50 to 52 miles per hour. This was corroborated by the testimony of Wallace Tatton. The testimony
of the witness Etta Johnson of the distances involved was
so exaggerated and misjudged that any inference of the
speed of plaintiff's automobile based thereon was mere
speculation and conjecture. Any finding based upon such
evidence cannot stand. The opinion testimony of Dr. Christensen, relating to the speed of plaintiff's automobile, if
it were admitted, is wholly incompetent. 'Dr. Christensen
was not qualified to testify as an expert on the application
of impact and momentum theories to automobiles. The
hypothetical question posed to him lacked numerous material factors, and included material factors not in evidence.
In addition thereto, the evidence shows the existence of
material factors for which no scientific formula could be
applied. Any opinion based thereon would not be entitled
to any weight whatsoever. The record is void of any other
evidence which would support a finding that the speed of
plaintiff's automobile was greater than 50 to 52 miles per
hour.
Under the facts of this case the speed of plaintiffs
automobile was not a proximate cause of the collision. It
is immaterial whether the plaintiff was traveling in excess
of 60 miles per hour or 30 miles per hour, since the collision
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would have occurred anyway. The difference would have
been only a matter of degree and not the difference of
whether the collision would have occurred. It was incumbent upon the defendant to show that even if plaintiff's
speed was excessive that such excessive speed was a proximate cause of the collision. There simply is no evidence
to support such a finding. Approximately one second of
time elapsed between the time defendant started to drive
forward, into plaintiff's path and the collision. The collision
would have occurred even if plaintiff were traveling 30 to
35 miles per hour.
Plaintiff was the favored driver on an arterial highway. The evidence shows that her speed was between 50
and 52 miles per hour, which was well under the statutory
posted speed limit of 60 miles per hour. She slowed her
automobile down until she observed that defendant's truck
had stopped. When she saw the defendant stop, ,she assumed that defendant was going to yield to her right of
way. She cannot be held negligent for relying on such
assumption. She then resumed her normal speed of approximately 50 miles per hour. To impose a duty upon the
favored driver on an arterial highway to anticipate that
a driver who is stopped at a controlled secondary road may
pull onto the highway at any instant and require the said
favored driver to so manage his automobile to avoid a collision in such event would impose a hopeless burden on any
driver, and would obstruct and impede the flow of traffic
on our highways rather than facilitate it.
The record shows that the conduct of plaintiff as a
favored driver on an arterial highway was reasonable and
prudent under the existing conditions. Plaintiff had no
duty to observe that defendant did not look in her direc-
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tion, and likewise no duty to sound her horn. Plaintiff
maintained a sharp lookout, and her conduct was all that
could be expected of a reasonable prudent person. Under
the tests and standards laid down by this Court in the arterial highway-secondary road cases, reasonable minds
could reach only the conclusion that plaintiff was free from
negligence.
We have no doubt that defendant was negligent and
that there is substantial competent evidence to support the
findings of the trial court that defendant was negligent,
and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Since appellant appeals only from the judgment
of the trial court denying appellant's right of recovery, we
have refrained from discussing the negligence of the defendant in this brief. We do not anticipate that respondent will
raise any question in his brief with respect thereto. In the
event he does, we may desire to file a reply brief herein.
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the trial
court denying appellant's right of recovery should be reversed, and that the case should 'be remanded to the trial
court with instructions to assess appellant's damages and
enter judgment thereon.
Respectfully submitted,

PHiuLIP V. CHRISTENSON
JOSEJPH NOVAK
for CHRISTENSON, NOVAK &
PAULSON,
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
55 East Center, Provo, Utah
STERLING R. BOSSARD
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
Richfield, Utah
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